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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DONALD W. YORK,
Case Number:

Petitioner/Appellant,

920378 CA

vs.
KENNETH V. SHULSEN, Warden,
UTAH STATE PRISON and DAVID L.
WILKINSON, Attorney General,
STATE OF UTAH.

Priority 3

Respondents/Appellees.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff petitions for a Rehearing because court based it's
ruling on wrong issues.

Plaintiff alleges issues to rule on are:

Did trial court exhaust every reasonable, available and recommended
effort to determine Plaintiff's state of mind at time of crime.
Did trial court protect Plaintiff's due process. Did habeas court
determine, by the record, if trial court had protected all of
Plaintiff's due process rights .
INACCURATE ACCOUNT OF FACTS
There was never a presentation of facts or evidence against
Plaintiff at the plea and therefore there is no established
statement of the facts. The state used dialogue from a deposition
of Dr. Alma Carlisle which was not published or used by either the
state or plaintiff in the habeas hearing.

The state also mis-

stated, distorted and erroneously reported statements from the
police reports.

The court, by relying on the state's account,
1

further distorts the account. The Plaintiff feels clarification is
needed for these statements.
1. Only Don York's name was looked for on the flight roster.
No one knew he was a MPD let alone that he used the name Dan Hell/
or Hill.
2. Plaintiff called the house before he came and talked with
Pat and Anita. (Habeas P26 L 2-6)
3. The house was in Plaintiff's name, he paid all the
expenses, his Utah business office was in the home, Pat had her own
home down the street in her maiden name.(Habeas, P 21 L 5-7)
4. The police found only 7 shell casings in the bedroom.
other casings were found by the police.(Habeas Exh. E)

No

5. Jeff Longhurst was found laying half-way out of the front
door with the gun and empty clip at his feet. The gun and clip had
Jeff Longhurst's fingerprints and another person's (not Mr. York's)
on them. Paraffin tests of Jeff Longhurst's hands indicated he had
fired a gun.(Habeas Exh. E, C).
6. Plaintiff went to the police station because he thought
there had been a fight because he had blood on him.(Habeas P 26 L
2-6) .
7. Plaintiff was taken to Lakeview Hospital because of heart
problems (stress related) where they did a blood test, (muscle
damage) trace metal test (holding gurney rails made inconclusive)
paraffin test, both hands and arms (no gun powder).(Habeas. P30,
L17-24)(Habeas Exh, B, C, E,).
8. Angle of wounds into Pat York and Jeff Longhurst could not
have resulted from the position witness, Anita Humphries, states
Mr. York fired the gun. No shell casings were found where Ms.
Humphries states Mr. York fired the gun.(Habeas Exh. E ) .
9. Mr. York came to his home to deliver $3,000 Anita needed to
pay off credit card charges and avoid criminal charges being filed
against her and to give Pat York $2,000 so she and Jeff Longhurst
could move to California. The police reports mention the $5,000 in
travelers checks found on the hall floor where Mr. York had thrown
them.(Habeas Exh. D)(Habeas. P 26 L 7-10).
10. A police officer asked Mr. York if he knew Jeff was dead
and he replied MNo, I didn't know that. That's to bad." Then a
few minutes later asked another officer how Pat was and later asked
same officer how Jeff was. (Habeas Exh. D, E) He told officer he
was Donald W. York and wouldn't say anything without lawyer. Later
he boasts the police couldn't catch him and says he'll go to
2

hell. (Habeas Exh. B, D, E) None of these reports have been verified
by cross examination and there is the possibility of error. It is
not uncommon for a person hearing a statement that doesn't make
sense to them, to restructure the sentence in recall, into a form
that does make sense to them. Plaintiff's alter personality was
named Dan Hell who didn't like the church Don belonged to, and Dan
was trying to get control.
POINT I
I. TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXHAUSTED EVERY REASONABLE,
AVAILABLE AND RECOMMENDED EFFORT TO DETERMINE
PLAINTIFF'S STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME OF CRIME.
The court has erred, as has the state, in consistently arguing
that the issue is to determine if the trial court should have held
a competence hearing at time of plea hearing and was Plaintiff
competent. They fail to realize the issue is denying Plaintiff his
due process by not pursuing the Dr.'s recommended additional
investigation into his memory loss. They fail to acknowledge that
the trial court had a responsibility to determine if Plaintiff had
grounds for an insanity defense, because the evaluations were
ordered for use in an insanity defense not a competency hearing.
It is possible for a person to be so mentally unstable when a
crime is committed as to be considered insane then return to a more
normal state after the crime. Therefore, by failing to order the
Dr.s to pursue their investigation as requested by both Dr.s the
trial

court

denied

the

Plaintiff

due

process.

A

careful

examination of the full evaluation of both Dr.s provides the
following:
1 They had difficulty determining how to identify the
Plaintiff's dysfunction and settled for Borderline Personality but
were not definite with it.
The diagnostic category seems to give me the most
trouble...Currently, the diagnosis that encompasses this
very
descriptive
disorder
is
borderline
personality.(Habeas Exhibit 2)
3

Diagnostically, he fits the borderline personality
disorder closer than anything else.(Habeas Exhibit 1)
2 Both identified the Plaintiff's memory loss:
...lf[S]ince he states that he has a hiatus or a memory
loss."...(Habeas Exhibit 2)
"However, he continues to complain of sometimes
blackouts, inability to recall certain episodes during
periods of trauma as well as during the so called normal
functioning periods."(Habeas Exhibit 1)
"There is a possibility he was suffering from
intermittent amnesic episodes because of the trauma of
the incident..."(Habeas Exhibit 1)
3 Both mention possible brain damage and identify possible
cause:
..."[T]here is evidence in the records ...a couple
of accidents where there was some brain injury..." (Habeas
Exhibit 1)
"The diagnostic dilemma also leads one into another
area of this person's dysfunction and that is the
possibility, where albeit minimal, is that of some
organic pathology."(Habeas Exhibit 2)
..."[0]ne would have to reckon with the possibility
of a person having some kind of rare 'seizure-like'
activity
in the brain that might render them
incapacitated for periods of time..." (Habeas Exhibit 2)
4. Both recommend
further examinations to determine
Plaintiff's state of mind at time of accident and obtain a more
accurate diagnosis:
..."[A]nd the only way this would be resolved would
be with a totally complete neurologic examination..."
(Habeas Exhibit 2)
"It is my opinion that further examination is in
order, including brain scan and electroencephalograph to
rule out any possible after effects."(Habeas Exhibit 1)
The Plaintiff alleges that the trial court did not exhaust
every reasonable effort to determine his mental condition at time
crime was committed; and had he ordered the Dr.s to continue their
examinations, as they recommended, the Dr.s would, most probably,
have discovered Plaintiff suffered from MPD, as Dr. Carlisle did.
With that diagnosis the trial court would have, most likely, sent
the Plaintiff to the state hospital for treatment where he likely
4

would have integrated, as he did in the prison.

When he was

integrated he would have been remanded back to court for trial,
which is what he is seeking now.

By the trial court not allowing

the Dr.'s to complete the evaluation, he thereby denied the
Plaintiff his defense and his due process.
..4"[A] conviction may nevertheless be challenged by
collateral attack in 'unusual circumstances,' that is
where an obvious injustice or a substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has
occurred, (cert omitted)...Such a circumstance exists
when there is a substantial likelihood that had certain
evidence been available at the time of trial, a different
verdict would have resulted.11 (emphasis added) Stewart v.
State by and through Deland. 830 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah App.
1992)
The Plaintiff has always alleged that the trial court should
have ordered the examining Dr.'s to continue their examination to
provide him with the answers he had requested and by so doing they
would have discovered Plaintiff was suffering from MPD. This would
most likely have resulted in the trial court holding a competency
hearing and his finding Plaintiff in need of treatment before a
trial could be held.
Such a hearing (competency) Mis not required if there is
a pre-plea determination of competence based on a
psychiatric evaluation and no new factual issues
pertaining to competence are raised in the motion to
withdraw the plea."(emphasis added) Johnson v. U.S.. 633
A.2d 828 (d.C.App. 1993) quoting Hunter v. United States.
548 A.2d 806, 810 n. 10 (D.C. 1988) (citations omitted)

5

POINT II
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROTECT THE PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER PLEA HEARING
Furthermore the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
his acceptance of his guilty plea because there was not sufficient
protection of due process and Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The court has rightly pointed out the Godinez decision and it's
clarifying there is but one standard for competency. But the court
failed to note that Godinez determines there is a higher standard
of inquiry required when a person is going to waive rights such as
their waiving of counsel, waiving of constitutional rights in
pleading guilty and waiving rights to a defense such as the
insanity defense.
In addition to determining that a defendant who
seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a
trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.(cites
omitted) In this sense there is a "heightened19 standard
for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel,
(insanity defense) but not a heightened standard of
competence. Godinez v. Moran. (1993) 125 L. Ed. 2d 321,
333
Below are the sequences leading up to and including his plea
and sentencing hearings and where there was compliance and/or
failure to comply:
1 Plaintiff filed motion for intention to use insanity
defense. In compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-144(1).
2 Trial court accepted motion over objection by prosecuting
attorney, Mel Wilson, and ordered Dr. Ghicadus and Dr. Kimball to
determine mental state of Plaintiff at time crime was committed.
This was in compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 77-144(1).

6

3 The Dr.'s filed their report with the court and provided
copies to the prosecution and defense. The points made were as
follows: (both Dr.s had same basic points)
A. Identified Plaintiff's dysfunction as Borderline
Personality disorder.
B. They both found Plaintiff mentally competent to
stand trial.
C. They could not determine Plaintiff's state of
mind at time of crime because of memory loss.
D. Both Dr.'s identified possible brain damage or
other possibilities for memory loss.
E. Both expressed need for additional evaluation and
testing to determine cause of memory loss and mental
state of Plaintiff at time of crime.
This was filed in compliance with Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.
77-14-4(2).
4 Before the trial court accepted plea of guilty.
The
following procedures or safeguards should have occurred but did not
occur:
A. The court did not authorize the additional examination and
testing requested by both Dr.s. This prevented trial court from
being informed of Plaintiff's mental condition at time of crime and
most likely of the information that he suffered from MPD.
The judge must nevertheless, make a determination as
to whether defendant1 s amnesia would lead to a denial of
due process...91 People v Douglas, 527 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup.
1988) quoting People v. Francabandera, supra, at 436, 354
N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292)
This also denied the Plaintiff the knowledge of the insanity
defense.
Indigent defendant entitled to "investigative expert or
other services necessary for an adequate defense11 18
U.S.C $ 3006A(e) (1) (1982 & III 1985) see United States v.
Crews. 781 F.2d 826, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1986} (Habeas, P 8
L 24-25, P 9 L 1-3)
B. Prosecutor did not file or serve upon the defendant notice
of rebuttal of the defense of mental illness, with names of
witnesses he proposes to call in rebuttal.Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure. 77-14-4(3).
C. There is no record of defendant ever withdrawing his intent
to use insanity defense.
7

As with waiver of all rights, waiver of an NGI (Not
Guilty by reason of Insanity) plea must satisfy certain
conditions in order to be constitutionally valid. In
particularr the defendant must be capable of making and
must actually make an intelligent and voluntary decision.
This requires the trial court to "conduct and
inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been
fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends
the consequences of failing to assert the [insanity]
defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the
defense.State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983);
Frendak. at 380; State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 82,
417 A.2d 585 (1985)
D. There is no record of the trial court questioning Plaintiff
to determine if withdrawal of intent to use insanity defense was
knowing and voluntary with Plaintiff understanding all of the
possible
ramifications
of
withdrawing
such
a
plea.
(defendant waiving counsel [or insanity defense]) must be
"made aware of the dangers and disadvantages...so that
the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open'" Godinez v. Moran.
(1993) 125 L Ed 2d 321, 333. quoting Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann. 317 US 269, 279, 87 L Ed 268, 63
S Ct 236, 143 ALR 435 (1942); Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 US,
at 244, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 89 S Ct 1709 (1969).
E. There was no formal
Plaintiff was competent.

or

informal

determination

that

5. The charges were not read to Plaintiff, in plea hearing no
statement or recital of evidence was ever presented.
a reviewing court must find evidence presented at
the taking of the plea which strongly suggests the guilt
of the accused, (emphasis added) State v. Stilling, 856
P.2d 666, 673 (Utah App. 1993)
The State must "properly establish a complete
factual basis, containing every element of the crime, in
its recitation to the trial court of what the state's
evidence would show if the case had proceeded to trial."
Id. see 674 quoting State v. Draper. 162 Arz. 433, 784
P.2d 259, 262 (1989) see also People v. Douglas. 527
N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup 1988), People v. Francabandera, supra,
at 438, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292), United States
v. Owen. 858 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1988)
6. Trial court proceeded to accept a guilty plea, whereupon
defendant's attorney interrupts with a colloquy concerning
Plaintiff's lack of memory for crime and which includes a statement
to the effect that the best they could hope for in a trial would be
"manslaughter and attempted manslaughter" • This is a lesser charge
than he pled to.
8

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled a requirement for
pre-Gibbons guilty pleas that the record must reveal
either facts that would support the prosecution of a
defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial
"not merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation
for entering the plea." (emphasis added) State v.
Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah App. 1993) citing
(Willett v, Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862)
The court's colloquy with Stilling does not address
the State's case against stilling and the elements of the
offenses, but compared the first degree felony charges to
the second degree felony charges and explained the
different penalties that attached to each. Therefore, it
did not add to the trial court's or this court's ability
to assess...[a] factual basis for the charges._Id^_
7. Trial court then asks Plaintiff if he has anything to say
to which Plaintiff replies with a request for an evaluation because
he has "no memory of it." To which the trial court replies "that
will come later."
When a defendant claims inability to stand trial due
to amnesia proved to be genuine, motion should be made
for determination whether, under all the circumstances
and with regard to the nature of the crime and the
availability of evidence to the defendant, it is likely
he can receive a fair trial.(emphasis added) People v.
Francabandera. 310 N.E.2d 292
8. Trial court then asks questions to determine if Plaintiff
understands plea and is knowingly making plea. Never does trail
court ask any questions to determine if plea is voluntary, if
Plaintiff was promised anything or if he was coerced, nor does he
inform Plaintiff of the need for "specific intent" to be
demonstrated to be found guilty of 2nd or 1st degree murder.
In addition to determining that a defendant who
seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a
trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.(cites
omitted) In this sense there is a "heightened11 standard
for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel,
(insanity defense) but not a heightened standard of
competence. Godinez v. Moran. (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 321, 333
The United States Supreme court imposed on state
courts, as a constitutional requirement, a definition of
"voluntariness" announced by this Court in McCarthy v
United States. 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d
418 (1969), in which the Court interpreted a provision of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9

McCarthy extended the definition of voluntariness to
include an "understanding of the essential elements of
the crime charged, including the requirement of specific
intent...," 394 U.S., at 471, 89 S.Ct., at 1173.
Both the defense attorney and the trial court
detailed the sentences that might be served but nowhere
is it indicated that the 2nd degree murder entailed the
Petitioner having an "intent to harm or injure the
victim".
Nor did he make a factual statement or
admission necessarily implying that he had such intent.
In point of fact he stated he had "no memory of it". (Plea
Hearing)
9. Trial court asks Plaintiff if he is ready to plead guilty
and Plaintiff answers "To get this over with"
During the fourth day of trial defense counsel moved
to allow the defendant to plead guilty and mentally ill
on all counts.
The defendant again testified and
declared that he had previously lied and now wished "to
get it over with."...Apparently concluding that the
defendant's request was not made in a wholly deliberate
and knowing manner, the judge refused the plea...The
trial judge appears to have acted to protect the
defendant from an act he might have later wanted to
reverse. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1989)
10. Trial court states that pre-sentence report of more value
to him than a 90 day evaluation or psychological evaluations.
Pre-sentence report was prepared by Susan 8. Wilson,
wife of Mel Wilson one of the prosecuting attorneys is
this case and the one who gave the prosecutors statement,
which is very inflammatory.
The preparation of this
report by someone connected with one of the participating
parties is in itself a violation of the Plaintiff's
rights.
The report itself contains many erroneous
statements and accusations concerning the Plaintiff that
were not substantiated by the preparer of the report.
The preparer was not licensed nor qualified to provide
insight as to the mental or emotional state of the
Plaintiff.
11. In sentencing the trial court cited his own feelings and
opinions as to the mental and emotional condition of the Plaintiff,
never citing or referring to evaluations prepared by Dr.'s and
drawing conclusions not in the Dr.'s evaluations. See sentencing
transcript or Reply Brief.

10

POINT III
HABEAS COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED, BY THE RECORD,
IF TRIAL COURT PROTECTED ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS,
NOT TRIED TO DETERMINE HIS COMPETENCY
This is an appeal from a plea bargain where no evidence was
presented.

In fact the very lack of evidence is, in itself,

condemning evidence for the trial court. There was no presentation
of evidence to the trial court, no inquiry by the trial court to
determine if the Plaintiff waived his insanity defense knowingly
and voluntarily, no questioning to determine if his guilty plea was
voluntary and therefore the only possible evidence to marshall
would be the Dr.'s evaluations and the court records to see if the
trial court did try to determine if Plaintiff knowingly and
voluntarily plead guilty, and these we have dealt with above. The
habeas court had testimony of Dr. Carlisle and Dr. Jeppsen who both
diagnosed Plaintiff with MPD.

He did rely heavily on Plaintiff's

statements at the plea
hearing, as does the state and this court. The court room demeanor
of the Plaintiff and his answers may be used to support a decision
of incompetency but may not by used to support ruling of competency
and therefore cannot be considered evidence used to support the
habeas court's decision or this courts decision.
As was the case here, a defendant suffering from
this illness may outwardly act logically and consistently
but nonetheless be unable to make decisions on the basis
of a realistic evaluation of his own best interests.
Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th cir. 1991)
also see Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 593-94.
By failing to make the distinction set out above,
the dissent incorrectly relies on cases such as (cite
omitted) which involve the denial of a hearing, as
11

support for its argument that we should look at trial
demeanor to support a competency determination made prior
to trial.Id,
Such a hearing (competency) "is not required if
there is a pre-plea determination of competence based on
a psychiatric evaluation and no new factual issues
pertaining to competence are raised in the motion to
withdraw the plea."(emphasis added) Johnson v. U.S., 633
A.2d 828 (d.C.App. 1993) quoting Hunter v. United States.
548 A.2d 806, 810 n. 10 (D.C. 1988) (citations omitted)
However, a petitioner is not required to disprove
the state fact finding by convincing evidence until and
unless that finding has been held entitled to the
presumption of correctness. The threshold question is
whether the competency determination is fairly supported
by the record. Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.
1991) See Demosthenes v Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 110 S.Ct
2223, 2225, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990).
...[0]ur initial inquiry must be to assess whether the
presumption is applicable here. Thus, we must ascertain
whether the competency determination was made under a
correct view of the law, and if so, whether it is fairly
supported by the record, considering "that part of the
record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, id. 28
U.S.C. $ 2254(d)
Plaintiff

maintains

habeas

court

erred

if

finding

him

competent when he should have been determining if Plaintiff's due
process was violated.
When, on the other hand, no state court competency
hearing has been held and the defendant has proceeded to
trial without such a hearing, the issue is not whether
the state record supports a finding of competency.
Rather the inquiry on habeas is whether the state court
denied the defendant his right to due process by ignoring
evidence, including evidence at trial, indicating that
the defendant might not be competent, and that a hearing
to ascertain competency was therefore required. Laffertv
v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th cir. 1991)
CONCLUSION
The question is not was the Plaintiff competent but is there
a possibility that had the trial court known that the Plaintiff
12

suffered from MPD he would have found him incompetent and sent him
for treatment? Did the trial court deprive Plaintiff of possible
defense and, thus his due process rights?

The Plaintiff had put

the trial court on alert when he filed his intent to use insanity
defense.

The Dr.'s alerted the trial court the problem was more

complex and asked for additional investigation.

Dr. Carlisle and

Dr. Jeppsen verified that there was a complex problem, MPD, which
is reasonable to assume would have been discovered by additional
investigation
The discrepancy between Dr.'s testimony concerning what was
occurring between Plaintiff's personalities lends further weight to
the fact that this was a complex dysfunction that couldn't be
quickly identified and the additional investigation was necessary.
The courtroom demeanor is valueless both because it is inadmissible
as evidence of competency and as in this case, you can't tell by
looking and listening if one or more personalities are out and if
they are communicating with each other.
The Plaintiff therefore requests the court grant a rehearing
and reconsider his case. The Plaintiff requests that he be given
the right and opportunity he would have had if he had been able to
use the insanity defense, namely to have his day in court.

Then

the state will have an opportunity to mount their case against him
and he the opportunity, given by the constitution to participate in
his own defense.
a reviewing court must find evidence presented at
the taking of the plea which strongly suggests the guilt
of the accused. Without such strong evidence, refusal to
permit the withdrawal of the plea would result in the
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anachronism of forcing a conviction to stand without
evidence of guilt, (emphasis added) State v. Stilling, 856
P.2d 666, 673 (Utah App. 1993)
The Plaintiff maintains that to deny him this writ and the
opportunity to go to trial is forcing /his conviction to stand
without evidence of guilt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /(t^7/ day of June, 1994.

reroxa D. McPhee
attorney for the Appellant
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I hereby certify that of the fg^J day of June, 1994, a true
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JANET C. GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARIAN DECKER
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

rold D. McPhee
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